On May 23, 2025, days before an aging coal plant in Michigan was scheduled to retire, the Secretary of Energy declared an emergency and ordered the plant to keep running for at least 90 days. Then the Department of Energy extended that order. Four times. By the court's own count, DOE "has compelled Campbell's continued operation for a total of 450 days" under a power the court describes as short-term and rarely used.
The D.C. Circuit has now vacated the order that started it. The opinion, written by Judge Pillard for a panel with Chief Judge Srinivasan and Judge Wilkins, holds that DOE exceeded its statutory authority, and it ends on one line: "For the foregoing reasons, we grant the petitions and vacate the Order."
The court reviewed the first order only; the four extensions were not part of this ruling. And it did not decide who covers the cost of keeping the plant open. Both of those questions are still open, and this piece shows you where each one lives.
The Receipt: Case No. 25-1159
The document is People of the State of Michigan v. United States Department of Energy, No. 25-1159, consolidated with Nos. 25-1160 and 25-1162, argued May 15, 2026 and decided September 11, 2026. The respondents are the Department of Energy and its Secretary, Christopher A. Wright. Consumers Energy, the private company that owns and runs the J.H. Campbell plant, came in as an intervenor alongside the regional grid operator, the Midcontinent Independent System Operator.
Michigan petitioned for review. So did Illinois and Minnesota, and so did a group of environmental organizations the court lists by name: the Ecology Center, Environmental Defense Fund, Environmental Law and Policy Center, Michigan Environmental Council, Natural Resources Defense Council, Sierra Club, Union of Concerned Scientists, Urban Core Collective and Vote Solar.
Open it to page 24. The Federal Power Act sets a 90-day life for each section 202(c) order in conflict with environmental law. Whether the Campbell order is that kind of order gets a short answer from the court: "this one indisputably does." Turn to page 25 and you get the extensions by number and date: Order No. 202-25-7 on August 20, 2025; No. 202-25-9 on November 18, 2025; No. 202-26-16 on February 17, 2026; and No. 202-26-22 on May 18, 2026. In each one, the court notes, DOE said the emergency conditions "will continue in the near term and are also likely to continue in subsequent years."
DOE forecast its own emergency, in writing, to last for years.
Now the sentence that limits everything else, on the same page. The petitioners challenged the extensions too, and the court writes that "we held those petitions in abeyance" until this case was decided. The court reviewed the first order and vacated the first order. On page 40 it explains why vacating it causes no disruption: the order under review "has already expired." The opinion does not say what happens to the plant next, and neither does this piece.
Who Pays Is Pending Before FERC. What the Opinion Does Record
Start with what the court actually wrote about the costs of DOE's order, because the opinion is careful and you should be too. Consumers Energy intervened, the court says, to "protect[] the company's right to recover the costs associated with DOE's order" from ratepayers. The same sentence places the recovery and allocation of those costs in separate proceedings now before FERC, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission. This court did not decide that fight. The opinion prints no cost figure for the plant and none for any customer's bill.
So the honest answer to "who pays" is that the question has its own proceeding at another agency, and it is not settled.
What the court did put in writing is how the market is supposed to protect you. On page 15, it explains that in a competitive capacity market, rising prices tell generators and regulators when to build or keep a plant, and low or falling prices "prevent over-investment in generation at ratepayers' expense." It contrasts that with command-and-control requirements and names the Campbell order as one of them. On page 33 it goes further. Keeping a plant approved for retirement running, while fencing it off from the market and the planning process, "distorts price signals," the court writes, and reading the emergency power this broadly to stop planned retirements "will likely discourage development of needed new resources."
The opinion records a harm of a different kind. The court describes Campbell as "increasingly inefficient, polluting, and expensive to maintain," and, citing the Michigan Commission's order approving the retirement settlement, says its emissions cause "approximately thirty excess deaths every year" when the plant runs.
It also records what the order overrode: a public process. The retirement plan went through Michigan's contested-case process, where interested parties could intervene, take discovery and cross-examine witnesses. Dozens did, among them environmental groups, several power companies and Michigan's Attorney General. That process produced a multiparty settlement in April 2022 setting retirement on or before May 31, 2025, approval from the Michigan Public Service Commission on June 23, 2022, and an affirmance from the Michigan Court of Appeals in March 2023. DOE, in the court's word, "sidestepped" all of it.
How the Machine Works
Section 202 of the Federal Power Act, as the court lays it out, has three tiers. Under 202(a), FERC organizes regions where utilities coordinate voluntarily. Under 202(b), FERC can order a generator to connect and sell power, but only when a state commission or someone in the business of transmitting or selling electricity applies for it. Under 202(c), the Secretary of Energy can compel generation during a war or when he "determines that an emergency exists by reason of a sudden increase in the demand for electric energy, or a shortage of electric energy or of facilities for the generation or transmission of electric energy, or of fuel or water for generating facilities, or other causes." The court calls that third tier DOE's only direct authority over generating electricity.
Congress wrote it after a "serious power shortage" in World War I, the court recounts on page 18, expecting it to cover wartime shocks and "similar crises" such as drought. In 2015 Congress let these orders override environmental laws, with a catch: an order that may conflict with those laws "shall expire not later than 90 days after it is issued." That limit runs per order. The next sentence of the statute itself provides that such an order may be renewed or reissued for further periods, "not to exceed 90 days for each period," as determined necessary "to meet the emergency and serve the public interest." DOE's four extensions have kept Campbell running for 450 days, and whether those extensions were lawful is the question in the petitions the court held in abeyance.
Everything else belongs to the states and their grid operators. States play the primary role in making sure there is enough power, the court writes. Michigan makes utilities show every year that they have the capacity to meet demand four years out, and makes them file long-range resource plans every five years. The regional operator sets reserve margins and runs a capacity auction.
Pages 20 through 22 show how that system handled Campbell. The Michigan Commission found the settlement would "enhance resource adequacy" in the region in the near and long term. The grid operator's own analysis found Consumers Energy did not need Campbell to meet its reliability criteria. The company documented that it had bought enough capacity for summer 2025 and beyond. The April 2025 auction results "demonstrated sufficient capacity at the regional, subregional and zonal levels," with the regional reserve margin for summer 2025 at 9.8%, nearly two points over target. Nobody in Michigan's system asked FERC for help under 202(b), and the governor declared no energy emergency over Campbell's planned closure.
Then came May 23. DOE's order, the court says, quoted a reliability report's warning that the region faced "elevated risk" of reserve shortfalls, while the same report concluded the grid operator had "adequate anticipated resources" for peak load. DOE's order itself acknowledged the operator had procured "sufficient capacity" for summer 2025.
The court's holding answers that on page 27. A section 202(c) emergency is "a grid-reliability risk that calls for an immediate response by DOE in particular." On page 37, it applies that test: "the mere possibility of an electricity supply shortfall," without specifics on how bad, when, where or how likely, "does not warrant an emergency federal response." And when DOE's September 8, 2025 rehearing order added that most regions "will face unacceptable reliability risks within five years," the court said on page 38 that the new rationale "falls even farther outside the meaning" of emergency.
Because DOE lacked the authority, the court did not reach the petitioners' other arguments, including whether the evidence supported DOE's finding and whether DOE could pick Campbell and run it past the hours the emergency required.
The Strongest Version of the Other Side
DOE's best case deserves a fair hearing, and part of it won. Built from what the opinion reports, the strongest version runs like this.
The statute does hand the Secretary the call on whether an emergency exists; the court says so plainly. DOE told the court that planning and adding generation is a "many-year" process, so a government that waits for the lights to flicker has waited too long. Retirements add up, and a forecast of trouble five years out is still a forecast of trouble.
The court took the timing half of that seriously. It rejected the petitioners' argument that an emergency has to be unforeseen and imminent. Its own example is a deteriorating nuclear plant that could cause a serious outage in three years without repairs now: if DOE has reason to believe the state won't act in time or can't, that can be an emergency, far off and foreseeable as it is.
The court's answer: the test is whether the moment calls for DOE to act, because the state and its grid operator have not and will not. In Michigan, they had. They planned for years, approved a replacement, bought the capacity, and DOE's own order admitted it. As for "many-year," the court turned it around: the complexity of that planning helps explain why the law leaves it to states, utilities and grid operators, not a reason to hand DOE a switch to override them.
That test is the whole ruling.
What You Can Actually Do
Read pages 22 through 25 of the opinion yourself. That is where the May 23, 2025 order, the rehearing order and all four extension orders sit. Write down the four numbers: 202-25-7, 202-25-9, 202-26-16 and 202-26-22. Those are the orders this ruling did not review, and they are how you will recognize each one when the challenges to them move.
Track the extension petitions by order number. The court says petitioners timely challenged the extension orders and that it held those petitions until this case was decided. The opinion gives no docket number for those petitions and does not say what happens to them next, so search by the four order numbers above and read the court's next order itself before any account of it.
Ask for the FERC docket by name. The opinion places recovery and allocation of Campbell's costs in proceedings before FERC and points to pages iv and 7 of Consumers Energy's brief for the company's stake. It gives no docket number. If you are a Consumers Energy customer, put the question in writing to the company and to the Michigan Public Service Commission: which FERC docket covers recovery of the costs of DOE's Campbell order? Read that record before anyone tells you what it will mean.
The opinion sets no deadline for any of this, so there is no date to print.
The So-What
DOE lost because nothing it identified called for immediate action by DOE in particular. Michigan had planned the retirement for years, its Commission and the grid operator had approved it, the capacity for summer 2025 was bought, and DOE's own order acknowledged that capacity. The D.C. Circuit says section 202(c) gives DOE no authority to use it as a substitute for the states' planning, and the first Campbell order put a federal decision over the heads of the people who did the planning.
Four extensions are still under challenge. The cost question is still at FERC. The word "emergency" now has a definition from this court, and the rest of this story has two proceedings left to run.
Come Back for the Rest
We do this every week: we open the document, read past the headline, and tell you exactly what it does and does not say. Pull up a chair, pour something cold, and let us send you the receipts when the extension challenges and the FERC cost fight move. Subscribe to The Long Pour and the next one lands in your inbox.
Y'all come back, now.
The Receipts
Every fact in this piece comes from the court opinion and the statute it interprets, listed here by the pages or section that carry each part.
- People of the State of Michigan v. United States Department of Energy, No. 25-1159 (U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, September 11, 2026; accessed September 13, 2026): the holding that DOE exceeded its section 202(c) authority, and the vacatur of the first order.
- Michigan v. Department of Energy, slip opinion at 1 to 4 (U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, September 11, 2026; accessed September 13, 2026): the parties, the panel, Consumers Energy's stake and the cost proceedings before FERC.
- Michigan v. Department of Energy, slip opinion at 15 to 19 (U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, September 11, 2026; accessed September 13, 2026): the three tiers of section 202, its World War I origin, the 2015 90-day limit and Campbell's emissions.
- Michigan v. Department of Energy, slip opinion at 19 to 22 (U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, September 11, 2026; accessed September 13, 2026): Michigan's settlement and approvals, the grid operator's finding and summer 2025 capacity.
- Michigan v. Department of Energy, slip opinion at 22 to 25 (U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, September 11, 2026; accessed September 13, 2026): DOE's May 23, 2025 order, the rehearing order, four extensions, 450 days and the abeyance.
- Michigan v. Department of Energy, slip opinion at 26 to 40 (U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, September 11, 2026; accessed September 13, 2026): the meaning of emergency, price signals, the five-year rationale and the expired order.
- 16 U.S.C. 824a (Office of the Law Revision Counsel, U.S. Code preliminary edition; accessed September 13, 2026): the 90-day expiry for a conflicting 202(c) order and renewal, as needed to meet the emergency, for further periods of up to 90 days.