He was born in Lehigh Acres, Florida. He had an Alabama driver's license in his pocket, the kind that complies with the federal REAL ID Act. And on May 21, 2025, on a job site in Foley, Alabama, an officer pulled that license out of his pocket, and officers told him it was fake, put him in handcuffs and held him for over an hour.
That is his account, from his complaint, as a federal judge's order retells it. On Monday, September 21, 2026, the chief judge of the Southern District of Alabama found that this U.S. citizen is likely to succeed on the merits and put three immigration-enforcement policies at construction sites on hold. The government's answer, the whole way through, has been that those policies do not exist.
So here are the two questions worth asking. Who decided a citizen's REAL ID wasn't enough. And what exactly did a judge just do about it. Both answers come out of one 24-page order, and you can read every page of it yourself.
The Receipt
Chief Judge Jeffrey U. Beaverstock signed the order, and it went on the docket September 21. It stays three policies by the names the court gives them: the "Warrantless Entry Policy," the "Preemptive Detention Policy" and the "Continued Detention Policy." The link goes to a copy the Institute for Justice posted at ij.org. It is the file-stamped version: the court's electronic filing stamp, "Doc# 106 Filed 09/21/26," appears on every page.
In the court's own words, the first policy permits immigration officers "to raid private construction sites without a warrant or consent." The second permits them "to preemptively detain employees without a particularized suspicion that persons are illegal immigrants." The third permits them "to continue detaining workers even after they show evidence of citizenship or lawful presence."
The plaintiff, the order says, "is a U.S. citizen of Mexican descent who was born in Lehigh Acres, Florida." This piece does not name him. He is a private person, and the story is what was done to him and what a court said about it.
Here is what the order recounts from his complaint. On May 21, 2025, he arrived at a housing site in Foley to lay foundations. Each lot had a No Trespassing sign up and knee-high black fencing around it. Around 8 a.m. five armed men, three of them masked, came over the fence and past the sign. The officers passed four non-Latino workers without stopping and headed for his crew, every one of them Latino.
When officers took his brother to the ground, he took out his phone, hit record and moved in closer. An officer grabbed him by the arm. He yelled, "I'm a citizen!" and "I'll show you my papers!" The non-Latino workers watching yelled, "He's a citizen!" A second officer tackled him anyway.
Then the license. An officer went into his pocket and came out with his Alabama driver's license, which the order describes as "a STAR ID that complies with the REAL ID Act." The officers "told him his REAL ID was fake," handcuffed him, took him off his worksite to an unmarked car and "held him for over an hour." Eventually an officer confirmed his citizenship and let him go. He was never charged with a crime.
Twenty-two days later it happened again, and this time the officers came indoors. On June 12, 2025, the order says, he was working alone in a back bedroom of a house under construction in a development in Fairhope. The house "had its walls, a roof, windows, and doors, but no garage door or siding." A federal officer walked into the house and ordered him outside. He said he was a citizen. He showed his REAL ID. The officers said it "could be fake," walked him about two blocks to an unmarked car and lined him up with other Latino workers detained elsewhere in the development. About 20 to 30 minutes later they acknowledged his citizenship and released him. Again, no charge.
Hold one caveat next to all of that, because the order does. Those encounters are his allegations, cited in the order to his complaint. The government's witness, Phillip Lavoie, an acting assistant special agent in charge at the Homeland Security Investigations office in Mobile, describes the May encounter "in a manner that is largely inconsistent" with the plaintiff's account, and says he could find no records of the June encounter in DHS systems.
A license the state gives only to citizens and lawful residents
Here is the part that should stop you. According to the order, Alabama "issues licenses only to citizens or those who are lawfully present," and the star on his license meant he got it with documents DHS certifies under the REAL ID Act. The court found that both times, he "produced a REAL ID within minutes of being questioned," and that the record "reflects" he "was not promptly released" after he did.
The court's conclusion on that point is one sentence: "A policy that permits such action is likely to run afoul of the Fourth Amendment."
Now sit with what the Continued Detention Policy means, in plain words. That is my characterization of the court's description, so take it as mine: a citizen shows a license built to the federal government's own standard, the officer decides not to believe it, and the handcuffs stay on until somebody gets around to checking. If a REAL ID does not end the stop, nothing in your wallet does.
The bill for that lands on a person. His complaint, as the order recounts it, says he lost nearly two weeks of work recovering after the May raid. And it lands on a particular kind of person. The complaint describes the Preemptive Detention Policy as letting officers detain workers "based only on a generalized demographic profile." The court, weighing the government's officer-safety argument, noted that "there were multiple individuals on the jobsite who did not appear to be Hispanic, and none of those individuals were detained in the name of safety."
Three policies the government says nobody wrote
Here is how the machine is supposed to run, according to the plaintiff. His complaint alleges DHS adopted the three policies "as part of a broader directive from the White House and Border Czar Homan" to increase immigration arrests and removals "by raiding workplaces based on which industries tend to employ undocumented workers rather than a prior investigation." It says the policies are carried out by the "Gulf of America Homeland Security Task Force," which, per the complaint, "enlists officers from seven subagencies within DHS and DOJ." He contends the policies sit in a written directive, and in the alternative that DHS adopted them as an unwritten policy.
The government's answer came from Lavoie, in a declaration the order quotes: "I am not aware of any Warrantless Entry Policy, Preemptive Detention Policy, or Continued Detention Policy used in my area of responsibility (AOR) as described by the Plaintiff."
The court had already ruled on that question once. On the government's standing challenge, it entered an order in May that, in this order's words, "specifically determined that the record as a whole demonstrated that the three relevant policies existed." After Lavoie testified at the hearing consistent with his declaration, "The Court remained satisfied that the three alleged policies existed."
And then the government argued its way into the policy. In its response to the motion, it argued that a construction site is like an open field, the kind of land officers may enter with no warrant at all. The judge dropped a footnote on that: the argument "completely undermines the Government's position that it does not have a policy of entering the non-public areas of a construction site without a warrant or consent." A second footnote does the same thing to the government's skepticism about the REAL ID, which the court says "undermines its position that it does not have a policy of continued detainer of individuals after a valid proof of citizenship has been produced."
So you get the line that answers it, and it is worth reading slowly. The government, the judge wrote, "has maintained that the policies for which [the plaintiff] seeks relief do not exist. It defies reason then, that enjoining those polices would 'curtail' anything." (The misspelling of "policies" is the court's.)
The open field that was a bedroom
The open-fields argument deserves its own paragraph, because if a court bought it whole, my read is that it would reach far past these two sites. The order says the government "likens a construction site to an open field where officers are always permitted to enter without a warrant."
The judge did not buy it whole. He wrote that "the Court is not persuaded by the Government's position that it never needs a warrant to enter a construction site." On the May encounter, he called whether the open-fields doctrine applies "not a simple question" and conceded that "a construction site can, in some instances, reasonably be considered an open field." But this site, he found, "was clearly the yard of a partially constructed home on a lot delineated by a small fence marker." And for June 12, the bedroom with walls, a roof and doors, "the Government has not convinced this Court that the warrantless entry into a structure ... does not implicate the Fourth Amendment."
He also found that the plaintiff, "an employee working at his place of work, has a reasonable expectation of privacy," quoting an Eleventh Circuit case that "employees have a protectable, reasonable expectation of privacy against workplace searches."
What the judge did, and what he did not decide
Read this section twice before you share anything, because it is the part easiest to overstate.
The plaintiff asked for one of two things. In the order's words, he asked the court "either enter a Preliminary injection or temporarily set aside the challenged policies pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 705." ("Injection" is the court's typo for injunction.)
Section 705 is part of the Administrative Procedure Act. As the order quotes it, it lets a reviewing court "issue all necessary and appropriate process to postpone the effective date of an agency action or to preserve status or rights pending conclusion of the review proceedings." In plain terms, that is interim relief while the case is decided, not a ruling that a policy is unlawful for good. The order says the standard for a Section 705 stay is "the same" as for a preliminary injunction.
The judge chose the stay. He wrote that the plaintiff "is likely to succeed on the merits," quoted the Supreme Court that "[a]n injunction is a drastic and extraordinary remedy," and concluded that "staying the likely unlawful policies is a less drastic remedy sufficient to redress Plaintiff's alleged injury." The motion was "GRANTED to the extent that the alleged policies will be temporarily stayed and otherwise, DENIED." No injunction issued.
Here is what that does not mean. It is not a final ruling. "Likely to succeed" is a prediction the court makes on the record it has, and the case goes on. The order itself still calls them "the alleged policies." The request for an injunction was denied.
And one question this piece will not answer, because the order does not. The order quotes a Fifth Circuit decision saying preliminary relief under Section 705 "aligns with the scope of ultimate relief under Section 706, which is not party-restricted," while noting the Supreme Court granted review in that case in part. The government, for its part, argued against "a district wide preliminary injunction." The order does not say, in its own words, how far this stay reaches. Watch for that. Do not assume it.
The Strongest Version of the Other Side
Take the government's case at full strength, because parts of it are real law.
Officers who are lawfully on a worksite may ask about immigration status. The order says so plainly: "officers who are lawfully present on a worksite can ask people about their immigration status." The open-fields doctrine is real, too. The order quotes the Supreme Court that "An open field need be neither 'open' nor a 'field' as those terms are used in common speech," and it cites a Sixth Circuit case finding a demolition site qualified.
The government also says its agents are trained to do this right. Lavoie's declaration says that "Once U.S. citizenship is verified, or an alien is found to be lawfully present in the U.S., ICE HSI Mobile Special Agents are trained to end the encounter," with a qualifier attached, "absent criminal and safety concerns," and that "All agents who were present during the May encounter attended this training," a refresher he says he arranged. On May 21 specifically, the government argued the officers made a "lawful brief investigative stop when Plaintiff attempted to interfere with an arrest," and that they "reasonably believed Plaintiff was attempting to interfere in an arrest, threatening Officer Safety, and that he may be an alien."
Here is what that leaves standing. The court looked at the video. It wrote that "videos of the encounter show that another individual was being detained," that the video "does not show" the plaintiff "attempting to verbally or physically interfer" (the court's spelling) with that detention, and that "the Government offers no factual support whatsoever" for why officers thought he "may be an alien." On June 12, where the government had no record of the stop at all but still claimed reasonable suspicion: "The Court is simply not inclined to take the Government's word for it."
And the precedent the government kept citing turned on it. The order says the government "repeatedly relies" on Justice Kavanaugh's concurrence in Noem v. Vasquez Perdomo, and that the concurrence "bolsters Plaintiff's position," and quotes it: "If the person is a U. S. citizen or otherwise lawfully in the United States, that individual will be free to go after the brief encounter."
The fair limit on all of this: it is one judge's preliminary read of a contested record, and the government's witness tells May 21 differently. The order does not settle who is right about every minute of that morning. It says who is likely to win.
What You Can Actually Do
Read it yourself. The order is 24 pages. Pages 1 through 4 are the two encounters. Pages 23 and 24 are the remedy. Nobody gets to tell you what it says after that.
Follow the case, not the headline. It is Civil Action No. 1:25-cv-00397, in federal district court in the Southern District of Alabama. A Section 705 stay is, in the statute's words as the order quotes them, relief "pending conclusion of the review proceedings." The case is not over, and the next filing matters more than this week's takes.
Ask for the paper. The plaintiff says these policies are written down. The government's witness says he is not aware of any such policy "used in my area of responsibility." The court, at this stage, found they existed. Ask your members of Congress, in writing, to request from DHS any written guidance on entering private construction sites and on detaining workers who show a REAL ID. A policy that exists should have a document.
Notice what the court leaned on. When the government's timeline and the plaintiff's account collided, the order turned to "videos of the encounter." By his account, he started recording before an officer grabbed him. That is what this record shows. It is not legal advice.
The So-What
A REAL ID is a state license built to the federal government's own standard. Alabama gives its version only to citizens and lawful residents. A man born in Florida had one in his pocket. By his complaint's account, it bought him handcuffs and over an hour in an unmarked car. The court's own finding is enough: he was not promptly released after he produced it.
That is not a misunderstanding about paperwork. That is the practice a federal judge just found likely unlawful and put on hold, over a government that says the practice does not exist, in briefs the court says undercut that very claim.
Come back for the rest
We do this every week: the official story on top, the document underneath, and every claim walked back to the page it came off of. Pull up a chair, pour something cold, and let us send you the receipts before the next quiet raid clears the fence. Subscribe to The Long Pour, the free newsletter where the week's little robberies and the one big one land in your inbox together.
Y'all come back, now.
The Receipts
The one source below was opened and saved on September 22, 2026.
- Order on Plaintiff's Motion for Preliminary Injunction (U.S. District Court, S.D. Ala., Doc. 106 in Civil Action No. 1:25-cv-00397-JB-N, filed September 21, 2026, Chief Judge Jeffrey U. Beaverstock, 24 pp.; file-stamped copy hosted at ij.org; accessed September 22, 2026): both encounters, the three stayed policies, the government's declarant, the cases it quotes and the § 705 stay.