On Thursday a federal judge in Oklahoma City told the state's charter school board to stop enforcing the one sentence in Oklahoma law that keeps religious schools out of the charter system.
The board did not fight it. It filed an answer, it kept its denial on the books, and then it told the court in writing that it does not oppose the relief the school was asking for. The only people in that courtroom arguing the state's side were two groups of parents and taxpayers who had to petition for permission to be in the case at all.
That is the first thing most coverage will skip past. Here is the second, and it is the one that outlives the religion fight entirely.
To get to the religion question, the judge first had to get past a 2024 Oklahoma Supreme Court decision which, as this order summarizes it, held that a charter school is "a governmental entity and state actor." He got past it. And the reasoning he used to get past it is not about religion. It's about whether a charter school is the government at all.
If the answer is no, then every rule that binds a charter school because it is public is a question again. Not just the religion ones.
The Receipt
The document is a 32-page order signed by Judge David L. Russell on September 24, 2026, in The National Ben Gamla Jewish Charter School Foundation, Inc. v. Shellem, Case No. CIV-26-582-R, in the Western District of Oklahoma. It is document 121 on a docket that opened on March 24 and had not, as of the capture behind this piece, recorded anything after it.
What it does, in the order's own words, is grant a preliminary injunction "precluding the Oklahoma Statewide Charter School Board from enforcing the nonsectarian requirement or otherwise excluding Plaintiffs from participating in the charter school program on account of their religious character." It also granted the two motions to stay discovery, one filed by the plaintiffs and one by the board, pending the resolution of any appeal.
The sentence at the center of it is short. Oklahoma's Charter Schools Act says a charter school "shall be nonsectarian in its programs, admission policies, employment practices, and all other operations," and that a sponsor "may not authorize a charter school or program that is affiliated with a nonpublic sectarian school or religious institution."
The school that wanted in is the Ben Gamla Jewish Charter School, a proposed virtual school. The suit was brought by the National Ben Gamla Jewish Charter School Foundation, and by its founder, Peter Deutsch, whom the order names in that capacity and no other. They applied in December 2025 to open a school offering a "rigorous academic education" alongside "instruction in Jewish religion, culture, values, rituals, texts, holidays, and practices," and they did not hedge about it: the order quotes their own complaint acknowledging that "the transmission of Jewish religious beliefs and practices to children is a core aspect of Ben Gamla's religious mission." The board, the order says, relied on the nonsectarian requirement and on the state's own 2024 precedent, and denied the application on the school's religious character.
Then the school sued. And that is where this stops looking like an ordinary lawsuit.
Nobody on the Defense Table Was Defending
Read this line from page 7 slowly, because the whole shape of the case is in it: "the Statewide Charter School Board does not oppose Plaintiffs' requested relief."
The agency that denied the application told the federal court it had no objection to being ordered not to do that again. The order drops a footnote to keep the case alive at all, citing United States v. Windsor for the proposition that a government defendant can agree with a plaintiff's legal position and still preserve a real controversy, because it is still refusing to give that position effect.
So who argued the other side? Two groups the court had admitted as intervening defendants back on June 3. The order calls them the Kaiman Intervenors, taxpayers who are in public schools themselves or have kids there, and the Moore Intervenors, families whose kids are in charter schools. Parents. Taxpayers. Volunteers, functionally, standing in for a state agency that had decided not to show up for its own decision.
They briefed it. There was a hearing with oral argument on August 5. And they lost.
Here's what that means as a practical matter, and it has nothing to do with whether you think the school should have won. A state agency's non-opposition is not neutrality. It is a thumb on the scale, applied before anybody walks into the room, and it converts an adversarial proceeding into something closer to a supervised agreement with a couple of outsiders objecting from the gallery. The court still had to do the work. The order is thorough and it engages the intervenors seriously. But the party with the subpoena power, the institutional record, the administrative history and the state's own lawyers chose not to use any of it.
How the Machine Works
Oklahoma already had an answer to this question, and it was the opposite answer.
In 2024, in Drummond, 558 P.3d 1, the Oklahoma Supreme Court held that setting up a religious charter school breaks Oklahoma's own constitution, breaks its statutes, and breaks the federal Establishment Clause. It then held that the Free Exercise Clause is not even implicated, because "a charter school is a governmental entity and state actor." That is this order's summary of Drummond, and this piece has not opened the Oklahoma opinion itself, so take the characterization as the federal judge's rather than as ours.
Drummond went to the U.S. Supreme Court and was affirmed by an equally divided Court, 605 U.S. 165 (2025). Four to four. And a 4-4 affirmance is the constitutional equivalent of a shrug: it resolves the case in front of it and settles nothing else. Footnote 5 of this order disposes of the whole thing in one quoted sentence, from a Tenth Circuit case: "[a]n unexplained affirmance by an equally divided court is not entitled to any precedential weight."
So the state's highest court, on this order's reading of it, said charter schools are the government. The U.S. Supreme Court split down the middle and thereby said nothing. And a federal district judge is free to reach the opposite conclusion, because, as the order puts it, quoting the Tenth Circuit again, a federal court "owes no deference to state-court interpretation of the United States Constitution."
That is the hinge. Everything after it is the judge working through the standard federal tests for when a private thing counts as the government, and finding that an Oklahoma charter school does not.
Is it a governmental entity? The federal test asks whether the entity "was created by the Government, is controlled by the Government, and operates for the Government's benefit." The order finds the first two missing. The Charter Schools Act "does not create any specific charter school"; a charter school exists only because a private applicant starts the process. And control fails because a charter school is run by a governing board "comprised of private individuals rather than government appointees or government officials," which the order contrasts with Amtrak, six of whose nine board members the President appoints directly, and with MOHELA, whose board is state officials and gubernatorial appointees.
Is it engaged in state action? The intervenors ran three doctrines and the order rejected all three. Exclusive public function fails because, as the order quotes a First Circuit case, "[o]bviously, education is not and never has been a function reserved to the state." The outsourced-constitutional-obligation doctrine fails because the intervenors "have not identified any federal constitutional obligation to provide an education," and because Oklahoma still runs its own traditional public schools and no student is required to attend a charter. Entwinement fails because, "[o]ther than permitting charter school employees to participate in the state retirement system," the pervasive entanglement the Supreme Court found in the Tennessee athletic-association case is not present. The order adds that the state "in no way compels or coerces any student to attend a charter school."
Doesn't Oklahoma law literally call it a public school? It does. The Act defines a charter school as "a public school established by contract." The order's answer is the sentence that should be on the front of this story: "simply labeling something as 'public' does not necessarily mean that it is created, operated, or controlled by the government."
And the money argument goes the same way. Charter schools run on public taxes and are, in the Act's words, "as equally free and open to all students as traditional public schools." They take the same state aid allocation, submit to the same financial audits, take the same student tests, and follow the same open-meetings laws. None of it moves the needle, because the Supreme Court has held, repeatedly, that the government "may subsidize private entities without assuming constitutional responsibility for their actions."
The conclusion the order reaches is stated flatly on page 28: "charter schools are not the equivalent of a traditional public school."
Why It Costs You
Here is how it runs, and you do not have to care about Jewish day school or about vouchers to care about this part.
Public status is not a compliment. It is a set of handcuffs. The Bill of Rights restrains the government, and it does not restrain your neighbor. That is the entire reason there is a state-action question at all, and it is why this order spends its whole middle stretch, pages 14 through 28, on nothing else. Whatever federal constitutional protection a student or a teacher has against a school, they have it because the school is the state. If it isn't, they don't.
Charter schools have been sitting in the middle of that line since they were invented, and the line has mostly been drawn by calling them public. This order pulls at the other end.
Read the reasoning again and notice what is not in it. There is nothing religion-specific about "does not create any specific charter school." There is nothing religion-specific about "comprised of private individuals." There is nothing religion-specific about public funding not creating constitutional responsibility, or about a holding that an extensive and detailed regulatory scheme still does not make a private entity a state actor. Those are general-purpose answers to a general-purpose question, and the question is the same one a fired teacher or an expelled student has to answer before a federal court will hear them at all.
The order knows it. Footnote 9 lays out a live disagreement among the federal appeals courts on exactly this: the Ninth Circuit concluded in 2010 that a fired teacher "had not plausibly alleged" that the nonprofit running an Arizona charter school "was functioning as state actor" when it terminated him, and the Fourth Circuit, sitting en banc in 2022 and over multiple dissents, held that a North Carolina charter school was a state actor when it enforced a dress code. Same institution, two constitutional statuses, depending on the circuit you get sued in.
So the cost is not a tuition bill. It is a question mark placed over which constitutional protections follow an Oklahoma kid into a charter school building, and the answer now depends on litigation that hasn't happened yet.
The Strongest Version of the Other Side
The judge made this case for the other side better than most of the coverage will, so use his version.
The intervenors' arguments, he wrote, "are not without force," and then he explained why he was following Supreme Court precedent anyway. He also wrote, in footnote 11, that "the key issues are exceedingly close, as evidenced by the Supreme Court's 4-4 split." That is a judge telling you his own answer is contestable, in the document announcing it.
Four more limits are in the order itself, and every one of them cuts against reading this piece too hard.
This is preliminary. The standard is a likelihood of success on the merits, not a final judgment. The order says the plaintiffs meet even the heightened standard that applies to disfavored injunctions, so the court did not have to decide which standard applied. It is still an interim ruling in a case that opened six months ago.
It is fact-bound on purpose. Footnote 12 has two sentences of text and here are both. The Supreme Court, it says, has "frequently emphasized that the state-action doctrine demands a fact-intensive inquiry." And: "Although the Court is not persuaded that an Oklahoma charter school is necessarily engaged in state action, other charter school programs with different facts may warrant a different outcome." Every other state's charter statute is untouched by this.
The judge is not convinced by the domino. Footnote 16 has two sentences and no citation between them. The first records that the intervenors "stress that charter schools will suffer negative financial and legal consequences if they lose their status as public schools." The second is the answer, and here it is whole: "The Court is not convinced that rejecting a charter school's status as a governmental entity or state actor for the purposes of resolving Plaintiffs' First Amendment claim will necessarily jeopardize a charter school's status as a public school for purposes of federal or state funding." That footnote is the single best argument against the framing of this article, which is why it sits here rather than in a rebuttal paragraph.
The court is not blessing the program. The Conclusion opens by saying the court does not express a judgment on "the wisdom of the State of Oklahoma opening up its coffers to charter schools of disparate philosophical or educational persuasions." The sentence after it is not another thing the court declines to decide. It is about Oklahoma. Having opened those coffers, the order says, the state "cannot, pursuant to the Free Exercise Clause, single out religious schools for exclusion solely because of their religious character."
There is a fifth thing, and it is the intervenors' cleanest shot. They cited three Tenth Circuit cases describing charter schools as public schools. The order pushes them off in footnote 15: two are unpublished, none is about Oklahoma, and, most importantly, they "largely assumed that charter schools are public without squarely addressing whether they are governmental entities or engaged in state action." That is a fair distinction. It is also an admission that the question has been assumed rather than decided for a very long time, by a lot of courts, which is exactly why one district judge answering it carefully is worth your attention.
What You Can Actually Do
Read the order. It is 32 pages, free, and written in plain English. Pages 14 through 28 are the state-action analysis and they are the part that will matter in five years. If you read nothing else, read footnote 16 on page 28 and decide for yourself whether you believe it.
Watch the docket, not the headlines. The case is public on CourtListener and every filing posts there for free. Discovery is stayed until any appeal of this order is resolved, which means the next real document in this case will tell you where it is going.
Go find the word "nonsectarian" in your own state's charter law. Every state that authorizes charter schools wrote one of these sentences, and that sentence is now the thing being tested. Pull up your own state's charter act and search it for the word.
Ask the question this order actually raises at your next school board meeting. Not "should religious charter schools exist." Ask: if a charter school in this state is not a state actor, what happens to a student it expels? That is a question this order does not answer, and the people who run the schools should be made to say so out loud.
The So-What
A state agency denied an application, got sued for it, and then declined to defend the denial. The state's own supreme court had already answered the underlying question, and this order leaves that answer standing. It declines to follow it instead, because the state court's conclusion "that charter schools are public schools as a matter of state law is not dispositive of whether a charter school is a governmental entity or state actor as a matter of federal law," and because a federal court "owes no deference to state-court interpretation of the United States Constitution." The U.S. Supreme Court, having split four to four, had settled nothing either way. And the argument that carried the day was not really about God. It was about whether a school that is publicly funded, publicly audited, tuition-free, open to all, and called a public school in the statute that created it is the government.
A federal court just said it isn't. Preliminarily, in one district, on one set of facts, with three footnotes telling you not to push it too far.
Push it anyway, because the reasoning is sitting in a public document and somebody will pick it up. What this show expects, and it is an expectation rather than a fact: the next plaintiff through that door will not be a school asking to teach religion. It will be a charter operator that wants to be private on the day it gets sued and public on the day the state aid check clears.
Bless their hearts.
Come back for the rest
This show does it every week. Every claim in this piece is tied to the document it came from, and the document is one click away, so you can check the work instead of taking our word for it. So pull up a chair, pour something cold, then subscribe to The Long Pour, our free newsletter, and the week's receipts arrive together in your inbox.
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The Receipts
Each claim above links to a document you can open yourself, with the access date on each line.
- Order granting preliminary injunction (U.S. District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma, Ben Gamla v. Shellem, No. CIV-26-582-R, Doc. 121, 32 pages, filed September 24, 2026; accessed September 25, 2026): every quotation, holding, footnote and page cite in this piece.
- Docket, The National Ben Gamla Jewish Charter School Foundation Inc v. Drummond (CourtListener/RECAP, W.D. Okla. No. 5:26-cv-00582, last updated September 24, 2026; accessed September 25, 2026): the March 24 filing date, the assigned judge, and entry 121 as the last known filing.