Close an account and the payments stop. That is how a credit card works, how a gym membership works, and how most people assume a pension works.

Jacksonville closed its Police and Fire Pension Fund to new hires on October 1, 2017. Nobody hired to a Jacksonville engine company or squad car since that morning has earned a single day of credit in it. The fund is shut. And the city's required payment went up again this spring, to $209,381,806 for the fiscal year ending September 30, 2027.

Before another number lands, the part that governs the whole piece. The police officers and firefighters in that fund did not do this. They were offered a deal, they worked the years the deal asked for, and the money is theirs. The average retirement benefit out of that fund is $67,492 a year. Nobody in it is getting rich, and nobody in it wrote the funding schedule. The figure at the top of this page is not a story about them. It is a story about the people who promised the benefit, signed the ordinance, and then spent years writing a smaller check than the one the math asked for.

The Receipt

Every figure below comes off one document: the Police and Fire Pension Fund's Actuarial Valuation Report as of October 1, 2025, 86 pages, revised May 14, 2026, signed by the fund's actuaries at Gabriel, Roeder, Smith & Company. It is public. It is free. Page one carries the whole story.

The required employer contribution for the fiscal year ending September 30, 2027 is $209,381,806. Last year's valuation put the same line at $201,499,077. The bill on a closed plan went up $7.9 million in twelve months.

As a share of the payroll of the people still in the plan, that contribution is 126.16 percent, up from 119.43 percent a year ago. Read that one twice, because it is the sentence the rest of the article exists to explain. Jacksonville is scheduled to put more money into the pension than it pays in salary to the officers and firefighters who are still members of it.

The gap underneath: the fund holds $2,634,319,599 in actuarial assets against an accrued liability of $5,996,176,950. That is a funded ratio of 43.93 percent, down from 44.11 percent last year. The unfunded liability is $3,361,857,351. After the city credits the present value of a dedicated sales surtax, booked at $1,605,133,106, the net unfunded liability is $1,756,724,245.

Now the human scale of it. As of the valuation, the fund had 1,460 active members carrying $165,113,592 in annual payroll, and 3,553 retirees, beneficiaries and DROP participants drawing $239,800,117 in annual benefits. For every active officer or firefighter left in the plan there are more than two people already collecting from it, and the actuaries put that ratio at 0.41 and falling.

Set the payment next to the budget. Mayor Donna Deegan's proposed 2026-2027 budget, presented to the City Council on July 20, carries a General Fund of $2,026,502,015. The pension contribution is a little over one dollar in ten of it. Divide the annual figure by 365 and the closed fund costs about $573,000 a day, weekends included, before a pothole gets filled or a library opens.

Why It Costs You

You do not write a check to the Police and Fire Pension Fund. You pay it the way you pay for everything else a city buys, which is by not getting the other thing.

Every dollar in the General Fund is a dollar somebody is going to spend. When one line takes a tenth of it and grows every year on a schedule nobody at the council table controls, the competition for the rest gets sharper each budget cycle. That is not an abstraction about municipal finance. It is the reason your branch library keeps the hours it keeps, the reason a mowing contract slips, the reason a drainage project sits on a list for six years. On August 28 the council's budget committee went through the mayor's proposal and cut $22.91 million out of it, as reported by the Jax Daily Record. That number is about a tenth of the pension line. The trimming happens on the side of the ledger nobody has locked down.

The same squeeze runs through the Jacksonville Transportation Authority's budget hole, where a projected deficit grew $29.5 million in three months and the people who ride the bus got handed the bill. Different agency, same math: the fixed obligations get paid, and whatever moves is what somebody without a lobbyist depends on.

And there is a second bill, quieter, riding underneath. Part of the pension debt is being paid down by a pension liability surtax, which is a sales tax. A sales tax does not ask what you earn. The cashier charges the same rate to a cardiologist and to somebody counting change for a car battery, which means the share of a paycheck it takes goes up as the paycheck goes down. That is the mechanism the poverty tax runs on, applied to a pension shortfall. The present value the city credits against this debt is $1,605,133,106, close to half the unfunded liability, and it is coming out of the checkout line. The debt was run up by people at the top of the government. A large share of the repayment is being collected at the register.

How the Machine Works

The fund's own actuaries explain the whole thing, in their own words, on their own letterhead.

Closing a plan does not retire its debt. Page one of the report, first paragraph, before a single table:

"In reviewing this Report, it is important for the reader to keep in mind that this Fund has been closed to new members since October 1, 2017. One consequence of this closure is that the annual payment on the unfunded accrued liability will tend to increase as a percentage of covered payroll over time, as such payroll decreases from year to year."

The $3.4 billion hole was dug before 2017 and it did not shrink when the door shut. What the closure did was stop adding people to the payroll you divide that hole by. Officers retire, the payroll drops, the debt payment does not, and the percentage climbs. It hit 126.16 percent this year. It will keep climbing, and that is math, not scandal.

The scandal is the funding schedule.

The 2017 deal let the city pay less now by spending a sales tax it will not collect for the fund until 2031. Ordinance 2017-257 put the present value of the pension liability surtax on the fund's books, under a Florida statute written to allow it. The actuaries describe what it does, and they are not gentle about it:

"Reflecting the pension liability surtax offsets the Fund's current UAAL by the present value of a future revenue stream (generated by the pension liability surtax) to be received by the Fund in calendar years 2031 through 2060. This delays the Fund's projected full funding date until almost the fiscal year 2060 and results in annual contributions to the Fund in fiscal years 2018 through 2030 which are significantly lower than the recommended contribution levels would be to ensure the Fund accumulates adequate assets to make all benefit payments (in the absence of the pension liability surtax)."

Thirteen budget years of paying less than the recommended amount, and a full-funding date pushed to 2060. If you were born the year the plan closed, you will be forty-three before this fund is whole.

Want the size of the discount? The report puts it on page one, in one sentence: for the year ending September 30, 2027, if the pension liability surtax did not exist, the required city contribution would be $328.75 million. The $209 million being reported as a record payment is the reduced number.

The math is required to count officers who can never be in the plan. To spread the debt, the valuation uses a 1.25 percent annual payroll growth assumption. The actuaries say this is not what they would choose: "For a closed pension fund, it is our recommendation to use a 0% payroll growth assumption." They use 1.25 percent because Florida Statute 112.64(6)(b) requires them to include the future payroll of police officers and firefighters hired after October 1, 2017, people the statute itself confirms "will not become members of the Fund." Tallahassee wrote a rule that inflates the denominator with the salaries of people who will never draw a dollar from this pension, and the effect of a bigger denominator is a smaller payment today.

And the actuaries say out loud who ends up holding it. The unfunded liability is amortized over an initial 30-year period, currently down to 22, while the average expected future service of the active members is 6.80 years. The report flags that against the state's own funding law:

"Furthermore, amortizing the UAAL over an initial period of 30 years (currently 22 years) is likely to transfer costs to future taxpayers, which would deviate from language in Florida Statute 112.61 which says 'Accordingly, except as herein provided, it is the intent of this act to prohibit the use of any procedure, methodology, or assumptions the effect of which is to transfer to future taxpayers any portion of the costs which may reasonably have been expected to be paid by the current taxpayers.'"

Their conclusion, verbatim: "it is our opinion that current costs are likely to be transferred to future taxpayers under this arrangement."

That is the fund's own actuary telling you the arrangement pushes the bill onto taxpayers who are not paying it yet.

Then there is the cash. The report's Schedule of Contributions lists what the city actually paid against what it owed. In the fiscal years ending 2018, 2019, 2020, 2021 and 2023, the actual contribution came in short of the actuarially determined contribution by $19,957,068, $24,736,292, $16,964,149, $13,750,618 and $146,246. That is $75,554,373 of light checks in five of the last eight years. The report notes the gaps were closed by allocating money out of a City Contribution Reserve built from earlier overpayments, so the obligation was met on paper. Fine. It was still five years of paying the bill with the emergency envelope, on a fund that is 43.93 percent funded and whose actuaries end their discussion by advising the city to consider paying more than the minimum, not less.

Read the whole chain in order. Promise the benefit. Close the plan and call it reform. Book a sales tax that arrives in 2031 so the payment looks smaller in 2018. Use a payroll assumption padded with officers who can never join. Stretch the amortization past the working lives of everyone in the plan. Cover five years of shortfalls out of the reserve. Then stand at a podium in July and present the result as a record commitment to public safety.

Bless their hearts.

The Strongest Argument on the Other Side

It deserves the full version, because it is a real argument and half of it is right.

These are earned benefits. The city agreed to them in writing. Paying the debt down hard is what a responsible government does, and a payment that goes up is evidence somebody is paying it rather than evidence of a fresh theft. The current administration did not close the plan and did not write the 2017 ordinance. It inherited the bill and it is paying it.

All true, and that is the point. The people running the government today are paying for promises made by people who are not in the room anymore and who never had to defend the schedule to a voter. This year's payment is not the failure. The failure is thirty years of budgets in which the pension line was the one thing a council could shrink without anybody noticing, because retirees do not have a lobbyist and the consequences land in a decade instead of an election cycle.

The firefighters are owed their money and they will get it. The story is the people who found it easier to promise the pension than to fund it, and most of them got re-elected.

The Lever

Two things are in front of voters right now, and both of them touch this number.

The budget is live. The council's budget committee is working through the mayor's proposal in public session, and it already cut $22.91 million out of it on August 28. Every piece of budget legislation gets a bill number, and every bill number is searchable on the City Council's legislative bill search. The pension line is in that package. So is whatever gets cut to make room for it.

Amendment 3 is on the November 3 ballot, and it needs 60 percent. If it passes, it takes effect January 1, 2027, which is three months into the fiscal year that carries the $209,381,806. Florida's own Revenue Estimating Conference, in the estimate it adopted on July 10, 2026, scored it at negative $4.93 billion to local non-school property tax revenue in FY 2027-28, negative $8.71 billion the following year, and a recurring negative $11.83 billion statewide once it is fully phased in. Those are the state's numbers, not an advocacy group's.

Now put the two documents next to each other, because this is the part nobody is saying out loud. Amendment 3 also writes a list into the state constitution of what counties and cities are permitted to spend property taxes on, and item six on that list is retirement benefits for local government employees. The pension payment is protected. It is on the list. Everything competing with it for a shrinking pot is what the list treats as negotiable.

The honest read: the pension gets paid either way. What a smaller property tax base squeezes is everything the constitution does not require a city to fund, in a budget where one obligation already takes a tenth of the General Fund and grows on a schedule set in 2017. What Amendment 3 does to county spending is worth understanding before you fill in that oval, because the tax cut and the spending list are the same amendment.

One more thing worth knowing about how this government got built. Jacksonville and Duval County merged in 1968 into a single consolidated government running across more than eight hundred square miles, sold to voters as clean-government reform after a corruption scandal. Whether that merger was reform or something else is still argued by people who study it. What is not argued is the structure it produced: one General Fund, one council, one place where every obligation in the county lands. When a pension payment takes a tenth of that fund, there is no second budget to move it to.

The document is free. It runs 86 pages, the discussion that carries the whole story is six of them, and every number in this article is in it. You do not need an actuary to read page one. You need about ten minutes and a willingness to look at what a city promised versus what it paid.

We do this every week. The official framing on top, the invoice underneath, and every figure traced back to the document it came out of. Pull up a chair, pour something cold, and let us send you the receipts while the budget is still in front of somebody.

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The Receipts

Every claim above traces to a primary source, with the page it was read off. Sources accessed August 31, 2026, except the Revenue Estimating Conference statement, re-read at the source on September 1, 2026.